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A REVIEW IN BRIEF OF PRINCIPLES OF
COMUNITY PROPERTY.*
By WmiAm Q. DE FuNixt
At periodic intervals there blossom out in the law reviews
and journals articles on the community property system. In
my investigation of these articles during the past year, neces-
sitated by the work I have been engaged upon, I have found
dozen after dozen. Unfortunately, of this vast number, only a
limited few by certain writers show a high technical ability
and extended research or a first hand knowledge of the civil
law from which community of property springs. Among some
of those which, are worthy of examination are those by Judge
Lobingier, John Vance, Walter Loewy, Harriett Daggett, W 0.
HEie, Alvin E. Evans, M. R. Kirkwood, to name but a few.'
But as numerous as the excellent writers are, the mediocre
writers far outnumber them. And by mediocre, I mean those
without a clear understanding of the basic principles of com-
munity of property Indeed, if it were not because of tls
regrettable lack of comprehension of so many writers as to
the basic principles, I should hesitate to add one more article to
the great number already written on the subject. But a re-
survey of some of the basic principles may not be amiss, es-
pecially in view of questions of taxation of community prop-
erty 2
By community property I mean, of course, that property
owned in common by husband and wife during marriage. A
t LL.B., University of Virginia (1924), member of the bars of
California and Kentucky; professor of law, University of San Fran-
cisco; author, de Fumak's John's American Notaries, and numerous
articles in legal encyclopedias and legal periodicals, etc.
* The following article is based on a book of the author in prepa-
ration for publication. The copyright therein is reserved.
'Reference to the Index to Legal Periodicals, under the head
"Husband and Wife", will make available numerous articles.
- Citations throughout are made to Matienzo, Commentaria
(1580), Azevedo, Commentarium Juris Civilis in Hispamae Regis
(1597); Gutierrez, Practicarum Quaestionum (1606); Llamas y
Molina, Commentario Critico-Juridico Literal a las 83 Leyes de Toro
(1827); Asso and Manuel, Instituciones del Derecho Civil de Castilla
(1771)" Schmdt, Civil Law of Spain and Mexico (1851)" Sala, Novisi-
mo Sala Mexicano (1870); Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos (1828),
etc.
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common development of the law of the civil law countries, al-
though having no origin in the Roman law but coming rather
from the Celtic and Germanic races, 3 it exists in various forms.4
As it existed in Spain, 5 from which comes the community prop-
erty system of several of our states,6 it was a form of joint and
equal ownership by husband and wife of all earnings and gains
by either or both spouses during marriage. But by earnings and
gains was meant that property acquired by "onerous title," that
is, by the industry and labor of the spouses.7 It did not include
property which was received by one spouse alone by reason of
gift, inheritance, devise or bequest.8
Nor did the community property include the property winch
either spouse had separately owned before marriage. That
property continued to remain the separate property of the
spouse owning it, even after marriage, regardless of whether the
spouse was the husband or the wife.9 Nor in the case of the
wife's separate property, did such separate property of hers m
any way come under the husband's management and control,
unless she expressly wished it to. In other words, even after
I See Brissaud, History of French Private Law; Huebner, History
of Germanic Private Law; Burge, Colonial and Foreign Law.
'In the Roman-Dutch community property system, carried from
the Netherlands to South Africa, all property owned before marriage
as well as any acquired after marriage, from whatever source, goes
into the common fund. See Lee, Roman-Dutch Law.
'Introduced into Spain by the Visigoths, it is found as early as
693 A.D. in the code Forum Judicium or Fuero Juzgo. It appears
also in the Law of the Westgoths, according to the Manuscript of
Aeskil, circa 1200 A.D.
a It was well established, of course, in such states as Louisiana,
Texas, New Mexico and California, at the time of their acquisition
by the United States.
See Escriche, Diccionario, "Oneroso" and "Bienes Gananciales."
"Everything that the husband and the wife may earn or pur-.
chase during union, let them both have it by halves; and if it is a
gift from the king or other person, and given to both, let husband
and wife have it; and if given to one, let that one alone have it to
whom it may have been given." Nueva Recopilacion of 1567, Book 5,
Title 9, Law 2; Novisima Recopilacion of 1805, Book 10, Title 4,
Law 1.
"A wife can have property of three kinds, dowry, parapher-
nalia, and separate property of which the husband has not the right
of administration. To this you should add a fourth kind, viz., prop-
erty acquired during marriage (as by gift)." Matienzo, Gloss II
to Law 11, Title 9, Book 5, Nueva Recopilacion. See also Schmidt,
Civil Law of Spain and Mexico.
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marriage her separate property remained subject to her own
administrative control and in her own hands.' 0
The fact was that in the Spanish law of marital community
of property, the wife was considered an individual in her own
right, just as the husband was in his. Marriage did not merge
her individuality into that of the husband, and make her the
mere shadow of the husband as has been the case in the English,
and the English-derived, common law. As far back as the Span-
ish code, Las Siete Partidas, of the year 1263, the right of hus-
band or wife to bring action against the other spouse was
authorized in order that property rights and interests of one
might be protected from wrongs or injuries by the other
spouse." And while the wife was required to have the consent
of the husband to the malkng of any contracts or the institution
of legal actions, tins was a formality, for the codes provided that
if the husband refused such consent or was absent, she might
apply to the court for any necessary sanction.1 2 Indeed, if any
contract into which she entered benefited or profited her, it was
considered a perfectly valid contract, whether or not the hus-
band had given his formal consent. 13 And if she was engaged
in the operation of a business of her own or held a public of-
fice, she could contract freely in regard thereto, without any
necessity of formal consent from the husband.14
0 The wife is accustomed to bring beside her dowry other
property which is called paraphernalia and which are the prop-
erty and things whether personal or real which wives retain as
their separate property and which are not considered part of the
dowry. From this definition it follows that if the wife turns this
property over to the husband with the intention that he may ad-
minister it, he shall possess it during marriage; if she should not
do this expressly in writing, the administration of such property
will always remain in the wife." Asso and Manuel, Book I, Title
VII, Cap. 2. 'Where they (i.e., the wife's separate properties) are
not specifically given to the husband and it was not the intent of
the wife that he should have the administration of them, she always
retains their ownership; and the same rule is applicable whenever
there is doubt as to whether she gave them to hn or not." Las
Siete Partidas of 1263, Part 4, Title 11, Law 17.
'Las Siete Partidas, Part 3, Title 2, Law 5. And Azevedo pointed
out that where property of the wife is spoken of, it means her
share of the community property during the marriage as well as
her separate property, since the word property denotes, in law, that
which is owned.
"Asso and Manuel, Instituciones del derecho Civil de Castilla;
Schmidt, Civil Law of Spain and Mexico.
'Llamas y Molina, Commentaries.
"' Schmidt, Civil LaW of Spain and Mexico.
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In respect of the community property itself, the admnis-
tration thereof was placed in the hands of the husband. This
has caused the greatest misunderstanding among our judges and
lawyers. For having been trained in the common law, they tend
to picture this administrative control in terms of the control
which a husband exercised over the wife's property at common
law. Following the concepts of the common law, they seem to
feel, only too frequently, that this means that m the community
property system, the husband can use the community property
solely for his own benefit and enjoyment. But such is far from
the case. The husband is only administrator of the community
property, subject to all the fiduciary obligations of any admin-
istrator.1 5 This was the principle of the Spanish system in
Spain and Mexico and properly continues to be the principle of
that system in force in our American states.1 6 The husband
cannot alienate or otherwise administer the community property
in fraud of or to the prejudice of the rights of the wife. So
soon as he attempts to use the community property entirely for
his own benefit or enjoyment, he is acting in fraud of or to the
prejudice of her rights, and she is immediately entitled to en-
force her rights in the property most vigorously 17 She may
maintain an action against him or against anyone who has par-
'Note that although the husband is permitted to alienate prop-
erty acquired during marriage, it must be understood that he must
not alienate with wrongful intent or in fraud of the wife. In no
case whatsoever may an administrator who has full powers commit
any act with wrongful intent; if such acts are committed they do
not bind the owner." Matienzo, Gloss VII to Law 5, Tit. 9, Bk. 5,
Nueva Recopilacion. "The husband alone administers the property
of the conjugal partnership during the existence of the marriage,
and he can sell and dispose of the same as he thinks proper, pro-
vided he always do so without the intention of injuring his wife
The husband is liable for deteriorations which happen through
is fault to the property of his wife." Schmidt, Civil Law of Spain
and Mexico. Alienation in fraud of the wife "is not allowed and
no one is permitted to be guided by wrongful intent. Nor is anyone
who has full and general power of administration allowed to do
anything with wrongful intent; if he does so he will not bind the
owner." Azevedo, No. 10 to Law 5, Nueva Recopilacion.
"See Ballinger, Community Property; Speer, Law of Marital
Rights in Texas, 3rd Ed., Daggett, Law of Community Property in
Louisiana.
I See note 15, supra; and Manresa in his Comentarios al Codigo
Civil Espanol, points out that the wife's ownership is passive only
so long as the husband administers properly and that the minute
he fails to do so, the wife's rights give rise to most vigorous action
on her part.
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ticipated with him in such wrongful use of the property or
against both of them together.' s
So long only as the husband was administering the property
honestly and efficiently was he entitled to continue such admin-
istration without interruption. Even then, the wife had suf-
ficient voice to object to any plan of action and specify that
she was not to take part in the projected transaction either as to
sharing the profits or bearing the burdens.1 9 And upon the
absence of the husband from home or upon showing his in-
capacity, she might have herself substituted as administrator of
the community property 20
Much has been attempted to be made of the argument some-
tunes advanced that the wife did not actually own half of the
community property but had only a sort of an expectant interest
which became vested in her upon the husband's death. This was
most definitely not true, and is now well recognized in all our
community property states. 2 ' Such beliefs are again influenced
by common law concepts as to dower rights and the husband's
"control" at the common law. The California courts, alone of
those of our community property states, for some time con-
sistently maintained that the wife did not have an actual owner-
ship of half the community property during marriage but had
only an expectant interest which she took as an "heir" upon
the husband's death. 2 2 In so holding, the California court pro-
fessed to be applying the Spanish-Mexican law of community
property, and did so in the very face of the pronouncements of
that law that the wife did not take as an heir upon her hus-
band's death but already owned her half of the property during
marriage.2 3
I See notes 11, 17, supra; see also Chavez v. McKnight, 1 N.M.
147 (1857), Kashaw v Kashaw, 3 Cal. 312 (1853).
"This rule may also be understood to apply even in cases
where the wife during marriage renounces her right to profits
either generally or specially as where she says that she does not
wish to share a building purchased by her husband or a lease of
state revenues taken by him; an agreement to that effect is valid."
Matienzo, Gloss I to Law 9, Title 9, Book 5.
'Asso and Manuel, Institutes del derecho Civil de Castilla;
Schmidt, Civil Law of Spare and Mexico.
'See "Community Property", 11 Am. Jur.
See "Community Property", Cal. Jur. Ten Year Supplement.
In 1927, the legislature enacted legislation to correct the error which
the courts had fallen into. See Cal. Civ. Code, sec. 161a.
"Moreover a wife receives her half of the community property
as her own by virtue of our law and similar enactments, and as
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The fact was that whicbever of the spouses acquired the
property during the marriage, by operation of law automatically
and without the necessity of any delivery, the other spouse im-
mediately owned and possessed half of such acquisition.2 4 This
did not result from contract or the liberality of the spouse earn-
ing or acquiring the property, but by operation of law itself.25
Somewhat similarly with us, earnings or acquisitions by one
partner in pursuance of partnership business accrue to all the
other partners. Or if an unemancipated minor earns anythnig,
such earnings are by operation of law the property of the
parents.
The Spanish law, as to community property, applied the
distinctions of the Roman law, as to habere (to have or own),
tenere (to hold), and possidere (to possess) Both husband and
wife "owned" (i.e., in the sense of "having") and "possessed"
-the property equally during marriage from the moment of its
acquisition. The husband also "bteld" it for purposes of ad-
to this she is not an heir." Azevedo, No. 8 to Law 7, Tit. 9, Bk. 5,
Nueva Recopilacion.
'The law (quoted above, note 8) provided, said Gutierrez, that
everything acquired during marriage by husband or wife, "let
them both have it by halves" "But if the husband alone acquired
ownership and possession of goods acquired during marriage, and
not the wife, there would be no equal division, nor would an equal
share belong to each, but an unequal one, contrary to the intention
and the language of our laws. And so the wife too will be the
owner of her half share during marriage, no less than the hus-
band, since the law has not contradicted this, though the husband
alone has the administration of these goods during marriage."
Gutierrez Quaestio CXVIII. "In the second place you should
note from the words 'let them both have it by halves' that owner-
ship and possession of a moiety of the property acquired during
marriage passes zpso sure to the wife without delivery and the
wife is owner even during marriage of the share which belongs
to her." Matienzo, Gloss III, to Law 2, Tit. 9, Bk. 5, of Nueva Re-
copilacion. The spouses are partners in a partnership, says Febrero,
and thus share equally whatever is acquired during the marriage,
whether or not one acquires more than the other; and on the hus-
band's death, there is no necessity upon the wife to demand her
half of the property from the husband's heirs, because it is already
hers. Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos. "It is evident according to
law that what is gamed by husband and wife while they are
together is the common property of both and they must divide it
in two, and there is no one amongst the authors who dares to doubt
it." Llamas y Molina, Commentary to Law 16 of Toro.
I "From which it may be inferred that such profit accrues to
a spouse by operation of law and not by the liberality of the other
spouse or by contract." Matienzo, Gloss III, to Law 2, Tit. 9, Bk.
5, of Nueva Recopilacion.
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mInstration.2 6  Thus, husband and wife both had a habitus
(i.e., act of having or owning), and the ownership of each was
often spoken of as an ownership sn habitu. Since the husband
also administered the property he had attached to his owner-
ship sn habitu the actus, that is the active administration. The
impression seems to have prevailed among some American
writers that the husband's ownership was described only as an
ownership -n actu and: the wife's as sn habitu, and that this
meant that the husband's was "actual" and the wife's 'con-
structive" But both owned sn habitu for that was the actual
"having" or owning, and both "had" or owned the property
A person with only the actus of property without the habitus
would be only a person having a managerial duty, such as an
agent, without having any ownership.
2 7
A survey of many of the leading jurists and commentators
on the Spanish law reveals that they were, with one early ex-
ception, unanimous m the view that both spouses owned and
possessed the property by halves during the marriage itself.28
'See note 24 supra. As to "having", "holding" and "possessing,"
see Buckland & McNair, Roman Law and Common Law. "Civil law
possession which is transferred without any act, actual or con-
structive, is called real and not constructive possession. From
which it may be inferred that the wife is entitled to all the pos-
sessory interdicts in respect of her moiety of the property acquired
during marriage, viz. to acquire, to retain, and to recover possession."
Matienzo, Gloss III to Law 2, title 9, Bk. 5 of Nueva Recopilacion.
' That the ownership of the wife was %n habitu and that of the
husband %n habitu and tn actu was so described by Matienzo, Azevedo,
Sala, Gutierrez, Covarruvias, Palacios Ruvios, Llamas y Molina and
numerous other jurisconsults. "The husband alone has the admin-
istration of these goods, whereas the ownership belongs to both
parties alike." Gutierrez, Quaestio CXVIII.
'See notes 24-26 supra. The exception seems to have been an
early author, Tello or Tellius Fernandez, who maintained that only
if the husband and wife conjointly acquired the property did both
own it equally during the marriage itself, and that as to other
acquisitions by the husband separately the wife succeeded to half
only on the husband's death, etc. The unanimous view of the
other jurisconsults over the centuries discounted this view, and it
has never seriously been considered for some five hundred years.
.For that matter it was not agreed to by contemporaries of Tello.
"The properties which, as marital gains or increases, should be
divided equally between husband and wife are not only such as are
purchased jointly by them during the marriage with the common
money and capital, but are also those which the husband purchases
alone, or the wife purchases with his tacit or express consent,
whether it be with the common money or that of either of them, as
the properties are m either event shared between them in the manner
expressed, because attention is given to the time of its acquisition
and not to the person in whose name the sale is made and by whom
they appear to be purchased." Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos.
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Some misapprehension has resulted in some few of the American
cases from relying on a mistranslation of the work of Febrero, a
Spanish notary, who, in discussing the husband's right to ad-
minister the community property, pointed out that the wife must
not interfere therewith by claiming that she tiene (i.e., holds)
the property The word tiene was mistranslated to mean "owns"
the property Since it was the word haber which indicated
"having" or owning and the word t'ene related to holding for
purposes of administration, it is clear that the author was not
saying that the wife must not claim that she owns the property,
but rather that she must not say she holds it for purposes of
administering it, since that duty was rested in the husband.2 9
This is also clear from the very fact that on numerous occasions
in other parts of his work, the author in question refers to the
fact that both spouses owned the property during marriage.3 0
Both husband and wife might, in the Spanish community
property system, contract freely with each other during the
marriage concerning their property rights. Either might re-
nounce his or her share in all or a part of the community prop-
erty 31 Such agreements or transactions between husband and
wife have been confused by many of our writers and courts with
the donation of the civil law.3 2 A donation was revocable by
the spouse making it, at any time up to his or her death, but if
the donor spouse died without having revoked, the donation then
became final and conclusive. But donations related to gifts from
the separate property of one spouse made to the other spouse.
' The husband "may therefore administer, exchange, sell and
convey the (community property) at his discretion, in the absence
of deceitful intent to defraud is wife. Therefore while the
husband lives, and the marriage is not dissolved, or there is no
divorce, the wife should not say that she holds (tiene) the com-
munity property, nor impede him in his lawful administration on
the ground that the law grants her half, for this grant is for the
situations mentioned and for no other (i.e., not for purposes of
administration), despite what some wives believe." Febrero, Libre-
ra de Escribanos.
See quotation from Febrero, note 28, supra. Just after the
text of Febrero quoted in note 29, supra, Febrero proceeds to explain
that upon the death of the husband the wife need make no formal
demand for her half of the property because it already belongs
to her.
'See Matienzo, Azevedo, and Gutierrez, Commentaries to Law
9, Tit. 9, Bk. 5, of Nueva Recopilacion, which was formerly Law
60 of Laws of Toro of 1505; Llamas y Molina, Commentaries on
Law 60 of Toro. Such agreements could not, however, be made in
fraud of rights of creditors.
See, e.g., "Community Property", 11 Am. Jur.
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It was felt that love and affection between the spouses might
tend to influence one to make excessive gifts to the other. 33 But
this principle as to donations related to separate property, as I
have said, and had no relation to transactions relating to the
community property, although even there, too, the law was quick
to scrutinize such transactions most closely, to see that they had
not been obtained by exercise of Intimidation, undue influence,
etc., to the detriment of the other spouse.
3 4
This right of the spouses to contract with each other during
marriage, in respect to their property, has been continued in
several of our community property states,3 5 but prohibited in
others,3 6 perhaps through the influence of common law concepts
that spouses cannot contract with each other during marriage.
The impression seems to prevail sometimes that the husband,
by virtue of his administration of the community property,
could give it away if he desired. But a comparative study of
numerous Spanish jurists and commentators reveals that no un-
limited right to give away community property existed in the
husband. To give was to lose, said one of them, and to give
away the property was equally a fraud on the wife's rights as
to transfer the property for an inadequate consideration. All
that was permitted, according to unanimous view, was that the
husband ight make moderate gifts, not out of proportion to
the total amount of the community property, to children, or rela-
tives or those dependent upon his bounty, where necessity ex-
isted, as to keep them from want, or the like.
37
3 Asso and Manuel, Instituciones del derecho Civil de Castilla.
I "It should not be thought that such an act (property agreement
as to community property) is a gift between husband and wife
and so prohibited." Matienzo, Gloss I, to Law 9, etc. Contracts
between husband and wife relating to the wife's interest in the
community property should be closely scrutinized "for the husband
can by entreaty, by importunity, sometimes even by threats per-
suade the wife to make renunciation in his favor." Gutierrez,
Quaestio CXXVI.
E.g., California and Washington.
E.g., Louisiana and Texas.
"Thus we must say that the husband can from the com-
munity property make gifts in moderation and for good cause, e.g.
he can dower a daughter of the marriage without the wife's consent,
provide maintenance for a daughter of the marriage, or make the
customary moderate gifts to kinsmen, friends, and members of the
household, and do sinilar things in which no presumption of fraud
or prodigality can arise. But gifts which are excessive or are made
for no legitimate reason or waste the community property cannot
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The equally erroneous impression has also sometimes existed
that the husband could waste the community property in de-
bauchery and dissolute living, without any right in the wife to
objet. 8 Here again, in the Spanish law, a realistic view actu-
ally was taken that a man is apt to make a fool of hnself at
times, and that he should not be held responsible for some wast-
age in that manner. But it was pointed out that if such wastage
was disproportionate so as to amount to a fraud on the rights
of the wife or began to prejudice her rights she could object
thereto, and might indeed remove the adminnstration of the
community property from the husband's hands.
39
As far back as the Fuero Real (Royal Code) of 1255, it was
provided that neither spouse should be liable for the antenuptial
debts of the other and that the community property should be
liable only for debts contracted during marriage for the com-
mon benefit.40 Only after community debts were paid and the
residue of the community property then partitioned between
the spouses or between a surviving spouse and the heirs of the
other, could the share of each in the community property be
reached either for the antenuptial debts or the separate indi-
vidual postnuptial debts of a spouse.4 1 The application m full
of these principles seems to be found only in Arizona and Wash-
ington, among our community property states.42 The others,
be validly made; for such cases reek of fraud and wrongful intent,
and prejudice the wife." Azevedo, Commentaries to Law 5, etc.
Matienzo and Gutierrez to the same.
I Matienzo, Azevedo and Gutierrez, Commentaries to Law 5, etc.
See also Felipe Sanchez Roman, Estudios de derecho Civil; Laws
54-59 of Toro.
"'Every debt that husband and wife contract m common, let
them likewise pay it in common; and if before union in marriage
either of them contracted a debt, let that one pay it and the other
shall not be liable to pay it from his properties." Fuero Real, Book
3, Title 20, Law 14. See also Law 206. of Laws of Estilo of 1310,
to same effect as to debts contracted during marriage for the
common benefit; Novisna Recopilacion of 1805, Book 10, Title
11, 'Law 2, as to neither wife nor her properties being liable for
separate debts of husband contracted during the marriage. By
properties of the wife was meant, as Azevedo explained, both her
separate property and her share of the community property since
,both were owned by her during marriage.
"0 Febrero, Libreria de Escribanos.
ICosper v. Valley Bank, 28 Ariz. 373, 237 Pac. 175 (1925),
Forsythe v. Paschal, 34 Ariz. 380, 271 Pac. 865 (1928) Bergman v.
.State, 187 Wash. 622, 60 P (2d) 699, 106 A.L.R. 1007 (1936)
" See statutes of respective states; Speer, Law of Marital Rights
in Texas, 3rd Ed., "Community Property", Cal. Jur. Ten Year Supp.,
"Community Property", 11 Am. Jur.
REVIEW OF COMMUNITY PROPERTY
again influenced no doubt by common law considerations, seem
to have the tendency to view the community property as if it
belonged wholly to the husband and to make it liable for his
separate debts, at least those contracted during marriage. The
situation is in such a state of confusion in our states, however,
that it is impossible to go into the matter fully, in an article of
this length.
43
In speaking of obligations, it may not be amiss to refer to
tort obligations or liabilities, since the principles governing in
the Spanish law were entirely different from those of the com-
mon law. A tort committed against the person of one of the
spouses was a wrong committed against that spouse as an Mdi-
vidual, and whether it was the husband or the wife, the spouse
injured had a right of action against the wrongdoer, and the
proceeds of the recovery, briefly, belonged to the injured
spouse.4 4 In the case of the wife herself committing a tort
against someone, hers was the liability As a separate
individual in her own right, hers was the responsibility, not the
husband's. 45
The marital community of property might be dissolved by
agreement of the spouses during the marriage, although the
marriage itself continued to subsist, and it was necessarily dis-
solved by the death of one of the spouses,4 6 and also in some
cases or to some extent by divorce.47 A divorce, using the term
in its old civil law meaning, which annulled the marriage com-
pletely, dissolved the community of property from the time of
the decree of nullity, and any property thereafter acquired by
either of the former spouses remained wholly the property of the
one acqiring it.48 It may well be asked how there could be
any community of property even to the date of the decree if
the marriage was annulled from its inception. However, it was
considered that if one or both of the parties had in good faith
4'Las Siete Partidas of 1263, Part 7, Titles 9 and 10.
"Nueva Recop. Book 5, Tit. 9, Laws 10 and 11; Novisima
Recop. Book 10, Tit. 4, Laws 10 and 11.
Schmidt, Civil Law of Spain and Mexico.
"Matienzo, Azevedo and Gutierrez, Commentaries to Law 2, etc.
17 "For then the marriage no longer subsists, and it was the
marriage which was the cause of sharing, by this and similar laws;
and if the cause ceases then the sharing must cease too." Matienzo,
Gloss I to Law 2, etc.
,Matienzo and Azevedo, Commentaries to Law 2, etc.
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entered into the marriage without knowledge of any impediment
which would invalidate the marriage, a putative marriage was
considered to have existed with community of property existing
between the putative spouses.4 9 If the divorce was one of
cohabitation, that is from bed and board, the spouse whose
wrong had caused the divorce had to share his or her acquisi-
tions with the other spouse, both those acqisitions obtained
prior to the divorce and those obtained after. But the innocent
spouse was not reqired to share his or her acquisitious with
the guilty spouse. There was no absolute divorce in the
Spanish law, as we have it, due to the influence of the tenets of
the Catholic church.
Since marital community of property, the law of water
rights, and some other matters, in some of our states, are based
on the Spanish law rather than on the English common law, it
is to the principles of the Spanish law that we should look for
interpretation and understanding of those various matters. Cer-
tainly where marital community of property is concerned it is
obviously absurd to try to attempt its interpretation and un-
derstanding by concepts of the English common law which had
no marital community of property and thus can provide no cor-
rect guides. Nevertheless, many writers and many judges have
attempted to do just that. But just as we look to the English
common law to determine and understand such of our law as is
derived therefrom, so we should look to the sources of the
Spanish law for enunciation of the principles governing our
marital community of property in those states having that sys-
tem. Since the Spanish law did not depend upon judicial
precedent as did the English common law but upon the codes
and the commentaries of jurists and jurisconsults thereon, it is
to the codes and the commentaries that we should look to deter-
mine such principles and concepts. The continuation in force
or the adoption of the Spanish community property system
necessarily continues it or adopts it governed by the principles
applicable to it.
' Matienzo, Azevedo and Gutierrez, Commentaries to Law 2, etc.
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